Thesis ledger
Dated forecasts and market interpretations with assessment criteria and subsequent outcomes. This records research, not portfolio performance.
Publication range: 2 Jul 2026 – 15 Oct 2026. Source: Hawk Thorne research record. Thesis descriptions retain the content recorded in the ledger.
Forecasts
23Claims about future events, assessed against a stated condition and time horizon.
- Held
- 8
- Broke
- 8
- Unresolved
- 0
- Awaiting assessment
- 7
Interpretations
117Assessments of current conditions. New evidence can sustain, revise or retire an interpretation. These do not contribute to forecast accuracy.
- Sustained
- 7
- Revised
- 19
- Retired
- 10
- Awaiting assessment
- 52
- Historical assessments
- 29
Assessment rules and forecast calibration
Since 27 July 2026, forecasts and interpretations follow separate assessment rules. Earlier interpretations graded against price thresholds remain in the history and are excluded from calibration.
Declared probabilities compared with assessed outcomes. Brier is the mean squared error; a lower score indicates less error within this sample. A small sample does not establish future forecasting accuracy.
Forecast calibration
scored forecasts: 17 · Brier: 0.252
The sample includes only resolved forecasts with a recorded probability. Interpretations and unresolved entries are excluded.
WIG-BANKI's continued five-session gain into 17 September still prices NBP easing from 3.75% that the 15 September CPI print (3.4%, rising) and a proposed fuel-tax holiday through March 2027 make harder to justify without a supportive projection revision.
What would prove it wrong
This reading is sustained if the Council's next projection round keeps the mid-2027 return-to-target date from the March round intact; it is retired if that round instead pushes the CPI path higher or later, removing the premise for further cuts.
Read analysis#How it settled
The falsifier explicitly hinges on the Council's next projection round testing the mid-2027 return-to-target date, but no such projection round has landed in this pack, leaving the claim untested rather than confirmed; meanwhile PMI fell to 48.3 and food prices are falling fastest, data not weighed in the original filing.
Brent's supply risk premium is unwinding as Saudi Arabia reroutes crude through Oman, while WTI's already-thin managed-money short leaves little further cushion for either grade if the decline extends.
What would prove it wrong
The reading is overturned if the next Commitments of Traders report, covering the week following 8 September 2026, shows Brent's managed-money net long extended rather than trimmed alongside the reroute story, or if wire reporting shows the Oman reroute reversing rather than displacing the Saudi supply flow.
Read analysis#How it settled
The 17 September note's falsifier asked for a NEW report to show WTI's or Brent's net long extending, or the Oman reroute reversing; the only report available, dated 15 September 2026, is the same one the note was built on, so neither leg has actually been tested by fresh data, and the note is revised into a forward-looking test rather than graded today.
Fed funds futures are pricing a firmer policy path (52bp higher over 12 months) even as leveraged funds keep covering a once-record Euro FX short, and the two signals cannot both be right about where dollar strength is headed.
What would prove it wrong
The Euro FX net short deepens in the next Commitments of Traders report while EUR/USD trades at or below 1.1535, reversing the covering wave and showing the priced tightening path is dominating the currency.
Read analysis#How it settled
EURUSD=X closed below 1.1535 on 2026-09-17 (close 1.14699)
An oil-driven inflation shock is colliding with a Treasury yield already at the 100th percentile of its year, while high-yield credit spreads at the 7.1st percentile still refuse to confirm the regime's stated credit-stress driver.
Read analysis#What would prove it wrong
If the 11 September CPI print shows core or headline inflation accelerating from the prior month's readings while high-yield spreads widen out of their current range, the premise that credit stress is disconnected from real-time inflation signals would be overturned.
WIG-BANKI's five-session rally into 9 September still prices NBP easing from 3.75% that the Council's unchanged, silent rhetoric on 9 September neither confirmed nor contradicted, leaving the trade dependent on a still-unpublished, expected-hawkish projection update.
What would prove it wrong
This reading is sustained if the Council's next projection round keeps the mid-2027 return-to-target date from the March round; it is retired if that round instead pushes the CPI path higher or later, removing the premise for further cuts.
Read analysis#How it settled
No fresh NBP projection round has landed since the 9 September note; the 15 September CPI print at 3.4% and the fuel-tax relief proposal narrow the case for cuts but do not themselves resolve the Council's stance, so the 9 September reading stands untested rather than confirmed or broken.
The options market is pricing calm into a rates market pricing a firmer path and a Treasury yield at the 99.2nd percentile of its year, a positioning gap the 8 September note's credit-stress finding does not explain.
What would prove it wrong
If the VIX closes above 20 in the five sessions following the 11 September Core CPI y/y print, the options market has repriced its assessment of the rate-path risk it is currently underpricing.
Read analysis#How it settled
VIXCLS closed below 20 on 2026-09-10 (close 17.84)
The regime's stated credit-stress driver is not corroborated by high-yield spreads, VIX or financial conditions, all sitting near their year's lows; the genuine extreme is the Treasury supply and rate-path story, with the 10-year yield at the 99.2nd percentile of its own year.
What would prove it wrong
If credit stress materialises as an independent driver, high-yield spreads and financial conditions indices would break their year's lows in tandem with deteriorating economic data on CPI or labour prints, removing the Treasury supply explanation's centrality to the regime read.
Read analysis#How it settled
High-yield credit spreads remain at the 8.3rd percentile and the financial conditions index at the 4.8th percentile of their own year, both still nowhere near the extremes needed to corroborate the regime's stated credit-stress driver, so the 8 September reading that the Treasury supply and rate-path story is the genuine extreme still holds.
WTI's managed-money short has covered to near zero (725 contracts), leaving little further short-covering fuel for its rally, while Brent's net long, though trimmed this week, still sits far from exhausted at a 52-week COT index of 3.0, giving Brent more room to extend on a persisting Saudi supply risk premium than WTI has left to give back.
What would prove it wrong
If the next COT report shows WTI's managed-money net short rebuilding into a net long while Brent's net long is trimmed further toward or through a net short, the asymmetry described here is falsified.
Read analysis#How it settled
The 8 September 2026 note expected Brent's net long, at a 52-week COT index of 3.0, to extend on a persisting Saudi supply premium; instead Brent fell 3.71% over five sessions as wire reports describe Saudi Arabia rerouting crude through Oman, moving against that premise even though the COT report itself has not yet shown the net long trimmed.
The 10-year Treasury yield's 99.2nd-percentile level already prices most of the current Treasury supply wave, even as the regime's stated credit-stress driver shows no corresponding extreme in high-yield spreads.
What would prove it wrong
If the 9 or 10 September Treasury auction (reopening) results require the 10-year yield to close above 4.95% to draw participation, and the yield holds above that level through the close of 17 September, the thesis that the supply story is already priced fails.
Read analysis#How it settled
DGS10 closed above 4.95 on 2026-09-10 (close 4.95)
WIG-BANKI's 2.44% five-session gain into 4 September 2026 prices further NBP easing from 3.75%, a bet a single-source wire report directly contradicts by calling for a 25bp hike after November, and the NBP's own March projection (CPI above 3.5% through 2026) does not clearly support either side ahead of the 9 September RPP decision.
What would prove it wrong
This reading is sustained if the RPP holds the reference rate at 3.75% on 9 September with no tightening language on the CPI path exceeding 3.5% into 2027; it is undercut if the Council signals it is considering a hike, or if the July projection round pushes the CPI return-to-target date beyond mid-2027 with explicit tightening language.
Read analysis#How it settled
The 7 September note's falsifier called for either a Council signal of hiking consideration or an explicit tightening turn in the projection round; instead the 9 September decision produced neither, a hold with unchanged rhetoric despite economists flagging a deteriorating inflation outlook the Council did not engage with, which is a distinct and less resolved outcome than either branch the prior note anticipated.
Fed funds futures price a firmer twelve-month rate path, 37.5 basis points higher, on an August payrolls beat of 162,000 against a 55,000 forecast, while the VIX sits at 15.2 (33rd percentile) with large positive S&P 500 dealer gamma showing the options market pricing calm.
What would prove it wrong
If the VIX closes above 20 in the five sessions following the 4 September 2026 payrolls release, the options market has repriced its assessment of the labour-driven rate path.
Read analysis#How it settled
no VIXCLS close above 20 through 2026-09-12
WIG-BANKI's rate-cut bet, still visible in its 0.92% five-session gain into 3 September 2026, remains unconfirmed by any updated NBP projection and is now directly tested by the 9 September RPP decision with the reference rate still at 3.75%.
What would prove it wrong
This reading is sustained if the RPP holds the reference rate at 3.75% on 9 September while deferring to a still-unpublished projection update; it is retired if the Council cuts or explicitly brings forward the mid-2027 return-to-target date from the March round.
Read analysis#How it settled
New reporting in the pack forecasts a 25bp RPP hike after November and frames the 9 Sep decision as directly affecting loan installments, contradicting the prior's framing of the bet as merely 'unconfirmed' and awaiting an unpublished projection; the reading must be revised to account for a hike expectation rather than a cut/hold binary.